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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 5 
V • 4 
LARRY PASCOE, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. i 
Case NoJ 870269-CA 
t Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of Automobile 
Homicide, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-207 (Supp.1987). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED pN APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's 
jury voir dire question as beyond the scope 0f the proceedings? 
2. Whether the trial court properlv admitted the blood 
test results where defendnat had not been informed he was under 
arrest and defendant consented to the blood test? 
3. Whether the trial court property admitted the 
accident scene photographs into evidence? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was convicted of Automobile Homicide, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann+ S 76-5-207 (Supp. 
1987), after a jury trial held May 5, 1987 through May 8, 1987, 
in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah/ the Honorable J. Dennis Fredrick/ Judge/ presiding. 
Defendant was sentenced to serve a term not more than five years 
in the Utah State Prison (R. 131). Defendant now appeals his 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the night of June 1, 1986/ defendant was driving 
home from a private supper club in his black pick-up truck on 
12600 South in Salt Lake County (R. 178/ pp. 121f 423). Mr. 
Lyman Farley and his wife Audrey were following defendant's 
vehicle and observed defendant's driving pattern (R. 178/ pp. 
121/ 186). Mrs. Farley told Mr. Farley not to pass defendant 
because defendant's truck was swaying (R. 178/ pp. 121/ 186). 
Mr. Farley followed defendant for about three or four miles at a 
distance of two or three car lengths (R. 178/ p. 121). 
While following defendant/ the Farley's observed 
defendant's vehicle go onto the shoulder of the road and also 
cross the yellow center line several times (R. 178/ pp. 122t 187-
8). Mr. Farley said that defendant was on the road about half of 
the time and off the road about half the time (R. 178/ p. 122). 
At least once# all four wheels of defendant's vehicle went onto 
the shoulder of the road (R. 178/ p. 188). Mr. Farley estimated 
defendant's speed at 40 miles an hour (R. 178/ p. 122). 
When defendant crossed the Jordan River# he accelerated 
"real fast" (R. 178/ pp. 123/ 139). The Farleys lost sight of 
defendant's truck for about 40 to 50 seconds as defendant went 
around a curve (R. 178/ pp. 129/ 190). When the Farleys reached 
the point where defendant's tail lights were last seen/ they 
could not see the black truck anywhere (R. 1}8, pp. 130f 140). 
Further down the road, they saw defendant's truck on a lawn 
facing the direction it had come (R. 178, p. 131). Defendant was 
laying on the ground in front of the black pick-up truck (R. 178, 
pp. 131-2). 
In a parking lot a few blocks away^ Officers Harvey 
Heed and Brent Christensen were sitting in their vehicle when 
heard a loud crash and observed sparks (R. 178, pp. 212-13, 269). 
They arrived at the scene within 45 seconds tR. 178, pp. 213, 
169). Upon arrival, Officer Heed observed defendant being aided 
by two elderly people (R. 178, p. 215). As Officer Heed 
approached defendant, he smelled a "strong o^or of alcohol" (R. 
178, p. 215) Officer Heed asked defendant it he had been 
drinking Ici. Defendant replied, "If you thihk I have been 
drinking, I want to take a test" (R. 178, p. 216). 
Several other officers responding to the accident scene 
observed defendant and formed an opinion that defendant was under 
the influence of alcohol (R. 178, pp. 218, 274, 367, 402). 
Defendant was not placed under arrest at the accident scene 
because the police were busy searching for £ child which someone 
had heard crying (R. 178, pp. 20-21, 217,-16 270). Also, Reserve 
Officer Mark Peterson, who was in custody defendant, was fearful 
for his own safety if he further agitated dependant by notifying 
him that he was under arrest (R. 178, pp. 26, 30, 43). 
At the scene and later at the hosp|ital, defendant and a 
i 
friend caused quite a disturbance (R. 178, pb. 43, 271, 273). 
Because of the commotion, Officers Michael Mitchell and Mark 
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Peterson requested three additional officers as back up at the 
hospital when they arrested defendant (R. 178, pp. 42-3). 
At the hospital, police told defendant that they "had 
probable cause to believe that he was under the influence of 
alcohol" and that they were going to draw blood (R. 178, pp. 41, 
47). After being so advised, defendant held out his arm and 
said, "Okay." JId. The blood test revealed a blood alcohol level 
of .21 within two hours of the accident (R. 4; R. 178, p. 471). 
At the accident scene, police found two opened bottles 
of alcohol in defendant's truck (R. 178, pp. 255, 293, 296). The 
accident investigation showed that the red pick-up truck driven 
by the victim had taken evasive action, was struck in its lane, 
shoved back, and cut in two (R. 178 p. 241, 309, 354). Defendant 
did not brake before impact (R. 178, p. 130). After impact, 
defendant's truck spun, rolled over, and traveled about 100 feet 
on it's roof (R. 178, pp. 310-1). Defendant's vehicle came to 
rest on its wheels some 189 feet from the point of impact (R. 
178, pp. 307, 311). The driver of the red pick-up, Jeffery Dean 
Chandler, was dead at the scene (R. 178, pp. 134, 269). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
During jury voir dire, defendant requested the court to 
ask prospective jurors whether they had ever worked with an 
insurance claim agency. The trial court denied defendant's 
request and ruled that the question went beyond the scope of the 
proceedings. Because the requested question was not relevant to 
determining jury bias, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to ask the question. 
This Court recently rejected defendant's claim that a 
defendant must be placed under arrest prior to taking a blood 
test pursuant to the Utah Implied Consent Statute. In any event, 
the trial court determined that defendant wals under arrest and 
consented to the blood test. 
Because defendant did not argue in the trial court that 
the photographs were gruesome, this Court should not consider 
defendant's claim on appeal. In any event, :he photographs were 
not gruesome in comparison with other cases femd were admitted 
after a careful weighing of their probative bnd prejudicial 
value. Where the trial court determined that their probative 
value outweighed any prejudice, this Court should not disturb the 
lower court's ruling in the absence of a showing of an abuse of 
discretion. The lower court did not abuse its discretion in 
ruling that the photographs were probative tp reconstruct the 
accident scene. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS pISCRETION 
IN DETERMINING THAT DEFENDANT'S QUESTION 
DURING JURY VOIR DIRE WENT BEYOND |rHE SCOPE 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
Defendant's first claim of error ib that the trial 
court erred by restricting defendant's questioning of prospective 
jurors during voir dire. Defendant's claim JLB meritless. 
A trial court "has some discretion! 
dire examinations," which "discretion should 
exercised in favor of allowing counsel to elicit information from 
prospective jurors." State v. Worthen, 89 U^ah Adv. Rep. 21, 24 
in limiting voir 
be liberally 
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(S. Ct. August 23, 1988). Further, the information gathered must 
be relevant. State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[m]atters of possible 
bias and prejudice on the part of the jury are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and its rulings on whether to 
question veniremen with respect thereto will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless it is demonstrated that the Court abused its 
discretion." Maltby v. Cox Construction Co./ Inc., 598 P.2d 336, 
341 (Utah 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 945 (1979). 
In the instant case, defendant asserts that the trial 
court did not allow defendant to fully explore possible bias and 
prejudice of the jurors. Defendant requested the court to ask 
the jury if "they have directly or indirectly worked with 
insurance agencies or claim adjustment or claim bureau, worked 
the period of their life or adult life." (R. 179, p. 28). The 
trial court denied the request explaining that the question 
regarding insurance went beyond the scope of the proceedings. 
Id. Defendant now claims that the question was asked in order to 
discover if any of the jurors had close working relations with 
law enforcement agencies. 
Notably, defendant did not ask the jurors if they had a 
close working relationship with law enforcement agencies. In 
fact, two jurors were married to police officers and defendant 
did pursue possible bias in that regard (R. 179 p. 19, 31). 
Surely, defendant could have asked the jury if any of them had a 
working relationship with police officers and, if so, whether it 
would influence their judgment. 
speculate how 
whether defendant 
Defendant also claims that the requested inquiry would 
have explored whether jurors had knowledge of "how insurance 
companies handle these cases" (Br, of App. at p. 4). Respondent, 
like the trial court, fails to perceive the relevance of this 
inquiry. Defendant does not even attempt to 
knowledge of insurance claims is relevant to 
committed vehicle homicide. In the absence <pf a clear 
explanation how this question was relevant to jury bias, this 
Court should find that the trial court properly ruled the 
question beyond the scope of the proceedings 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S 
BLOOD TEST RESULTS. 
A. The Utah Implied Consent Statute Does Not 
Require A Defendant to Be Under Arfest Prior 
To Taking A Blood Test. 
Defendant next claims the trial coiirt erred in not 
suppressing defendant's blood test results, 
blood tests were inadmissible because he was 
the time the blood was drawn and was not told the results could 
be used against him. Defendant's claim must 
He claims that the 
not under arrest at 
be rejected. 
The Implied Consent statute provides as follows: 
(1) Any person operating a motor jvehicle in 
this state is considered to have given his 
consent to a chemical test or tests of his 
breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of 
determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while having a blood or breath alcbhol 
content statutorily prohibited, or while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
conbination of alcohol and any drug under 
Section 41-6-44, if the test is or tests are 
administetered at the direction of a peace 
officer having grounds to believe that person 
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to have been operating or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug under Section 41-6-44. 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-44.10(1)(a) (1988). In State v. Wight, 97 
Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah App. December 1, 1988), this Court 
rejected the claim now asserted by defendant. This Court ruled 
that if "an arrest has not taken place, the subject is entitled 
to know the purpose for which the blood is drawn and the subject 
may withdraw the statutory implied consent." Jd. at 29, citing, 
In Re I., R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), cert, granted, 
765 P.2d 1277 (1987). Further, this Court observed that the 
Implied Consent Statute does not require an arrest prior to 
taking a blood sample. Wight, at 29. In fact, the statute only 
requires a preceding arrest for the purpose of revoking a 
person's drivers' license for refusing to take a test when 
requested by a peace officer. Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-
44.10(2)(a) and (8). Therefore, it is immaterial whether 
defendant was arrested prior to drawing the blood sample. 
B. Defendant Did Not Withdraw His Statutory 
Implied Consent After Being Informed Of The 
Purpose Of The Blood Test. 
Defendant contends that he neither consented to the 
blood test nor was he told the purpose for which the blood was 
drawn. Defendant's contentions are meritless. 
In the present case, the trial court found that defendant had 
been arrested pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-6(1)(1982). (R. 
178, p. 78). 
As discussed above, a subject "is entitled to know the 
purpose for which the blood is drawn and thel subject may withdraw 
the statutory implied consent." Wight, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29. 
No further warnings or explanations are required 
In the present case, Officer Heed bommented to 
defendant at the accident scene that, "it smells like you have 
been drinking." (R. 178, P. 18). Defendant Responded, "If you 
think I have been drinking, I want to take a 
Later at the hospital, Officer Mitchell, Reserve 
Officer Peterson, and blood technician Brianj Davis, approached 
defendant in the x-ray room and informed defendant they wanted to 
draw blood from him (R. 178, P. 40-41). Whep defendant asked 
why, Officer Mitchell advised him that they 
believe that he was under the influence of at 
based upon that probable cause, they were gop 
178, p. 41, 47). After Officer Mitchell had 
test, Id. 
"had reason to 
Icohol" and that 
p.ng to draw blood (R, 
so advised 
defendant, defendant held out his arm and sap.d, "Okay." Id. No 
force was used to draw the blood. (R. 178, pi. 42). Based upon 
this evidence the trial court found that defendant consented to 
the blood test "by saying, 'Okay, go ahead,1 and holding out his 
arm to provide a site" (R. 178, p. 79). 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that an 
appellate court will not set aside a trial court's factual 
finding unless it is "clearly erroneous" giving due deference the 
trial court's determination of the credibility of the witnesses. 
State v. Kelly, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 3 (S. Cr. September 23, 
1988), citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). In 
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light of the strong evidence that defendant was informed of the 
purpose of the blood draw and that he did not withdraw his 
statutory implied consent, this Court should not disturb the 
lower court's finding. 
Defendant relies on this Court's opinion in In Re I., 
R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), cert, granted, 765 P.2d 
1277 (1987) where this Court concluded that "the blood test 
evidence must be excluded as the product of an unconstitutional 
search and seizure." Ici. at 1128. In that case, the defendant 
resisted the blood test and was not informed that the blood test 
was being taken to determine blood alcohol content. Id. at 1128. 
This Court further stated that "under the circumstances, 
reasonable minds could conclude that blood was being withdrawn 
for medical rather than law-enforcement purposes." Id. Because 
the defendant was not informed of the purpose of the test and he 
physically refused the test, this Court found that the Implied 
Consent Statute procedures were not followed. 
The present case is distinguishable from I., R.L. and 
is consistent with the Wight opinion. Here, defendant was told 
by police that he was suspected of being under the influence of 
alcohol and that they were going to draw his blood (R. 178, p. 
41, 47). Defendant said MOkay,M and held his arm out without 
resistance. Id. Additionally, defendant had earlier requested 
to be tested in response to the police officer's statement that 
he suspected defendant to be intoxicated (R. 178, p. 18). Under 
these circumstances, defendant consented to the blood test as 
provided by the Implied Consent Statute. 
Defendant further claims that the police were obligated 
to inform him that the blood test could be used as evidence 
against him in a homicide investigation, Thp Implied Consent 
Statute does not require a police officer tol inform a defendant 
of the purpose of the test beyond determining blood alcohol 
content. See Wight, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29 
does not support his claim with relevant legal analysis or 
authority, this Court should not consider hi 
v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984). 
Defendant also claims that the pol 
inform him that he could refuse the test. T 
rejected by the Utah Surpeme Court in State 
Because defendant 
p claim. See State 
ice had a duty to 
pis argument was 
V. Whittenback, 621 
P.2d 103 (Utah 1980) where the Court said: 
Clearly the prosecution has the butden of 
establishing from the totality of phe 
circumstances that the consent was 
voluntarily given; however, the prpsecution 
is not required to prove that defendant knew 
of his right to refuse to consent in order to 
show voluntariness. . . . 
Id. at 106 (Footnote omitted). Because the prosecution is not 
required to prove defendant knew of his right to refuse, 
defendant's argument must fail. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ADMITTING ACCIDENT SCENE PHOTOGRAPHS INTO 
EVIDENCE. 
Defendant's final claim is that th£ trial court erred 
in admitting photographs of the accident sce^e which defendant 
claims were gruesome and cumulative. Defendant's argument is 
meritless. 
11-
Relevant evidence may be excluded under Rule 403, Utah 
R. Evid. under the following circumstances: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion# or waste of 
time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403. The Utah Supreme Court has required a 
stricter standard of admissibility where the evidence to be 
introduced is a "gruesome" photograph. State v. Lafferty, 749 
P. 2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, a gruesome photograph 
is admissible only if its "essential evidentiary value" outweighs 
its potential for prejudice. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 
(Utah 1986); State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah 1983). The 
more inflammatory the photograph, the greater the need to 
establish its essential evidentiary value, and conversely, the 
greater its essential evidentiary value, the greater the 
defendant's burden to show its prejudicial effect. Garcia, 663 
P.2d at 64. In either case, the decision to admit the photograph 
is within the sound discretion of the trial court and that 
court's decision must not be overturned unless an abuse of 
discretion is clearly established. JId. at 64. 
Gruesome photographs are generally inappropriate unless 
they have an unusual probative value. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 
1256-57. This strict standard of admissibility is due to the 
unusually strong propensity of gruesome photographs to "unfairly 
prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury." Id.jat 1256. On the 
other hand, "photographs that are only negligibly gruesome have 
little potential for unduly prejudicing the jury, and their 
admission therefore does not constitute an abuse of the court's 
discretion." State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050 1055 (Utah 1987). 
While the gruesomeness of a photograph is difficult to 
quantify, a review of Utah case law provides a framework from 
which the present case can be measured. In State v. Poe, 21 Utah 
2d 355, 441 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968), the Utah Supreme Court reversed 
a first degree murder conviction based on th^ lower court's 
erroneous admission of color slides taken during the course of 
the victim's autopsy. The Court described the color slides 
introduced in that case as follows: 
The colored slides were made during the 
course of an autopsy. To describe "[them as 
being gruesome would be a gross under-
statement. One of them, for example, 
depicted the deceased's head, showing the 
base of the skull after the skull cap and 
brain had been removed by the pathologist. 
The skin is peeled over the edge of the skull 
showing the empty brain cavity. Another is a 
top view of the empty cavity. . . J 
Poe, 441 P.2d at 514. The high court concluded that the gruesome 
slides "could very well have tipped the scales in favor of the 
death penalty." Jki. at 515 (footnote omitted). 
Similarly, in State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), 
the Utah Supreme Court found that a photograph showing a stabbing 
victim's bloody corpse was gruesome. However, when the gruesome 
photograph was taken in context with other admissible 
photographs, the court found that the "impact of gore was not so 
significant as to render its admission an abulse of discretion so 
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prejudicial that it requires reversal." Jd. at 65 (citations 
omitted). 
In State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986), the State 
introduced photographs of a homicide victim lying face up in a 
pool of coagulated blood. The Utah Supreme Court, in applying 
the strict admissibility standard, found that the photographs 
were gruesome, were not relevant to rebut defendant's claim of 
extreme emotional distress, and were unduly emphasized by the 
prosecutor, ^d. at 754-55. Upon finding that the error was not 
harmless, the court reversed and remanded the case for a new 
trial. Id. at 755-56. 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lafferty, 
749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) determined that the photographs 
admitted into evidence were gruesome. In Lafferty, the State 
introduced a photograph showing a baby's corpse lying in a crib 
with its blood-covered throat sliced open. Jd. at 1256. Another 
photograph showed the corpse of the baby's mother lying 
unnaturally contorted in a pool of blood, ^d. While the court 
found the photographs to approximate the gruesomeness found 
reversible in Poe and Cloud, their admission was harmless in 
light of the lack of emphasis on the photographs and the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt. IdL at 1257. 
In the present case, defendant objected to exhibits 
eleven or twelve as cumulative, and exhibits ten, fifteen, or 
sixteen as cumulative (R. 178, pp. 266, 290). He argued that 
only one photograph from each set should be admitted. Id. 
However, he did not argue or object on the grounds that the 
photographs were gruesome. It is well-established that a 
defendant waives any issue regarding the admissibility of 
evidence if he fails to state a timely and specific objection. 
See Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1); State v. Mitchekl, 671 P.2d 213, 214 
(Utah 1983); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982) 
(contemporaneous objection rule applied). Because defendant did 
not specifically raise the gruesomeness issue before the trial 
court, this Court should not consider defendant's claim on 
appeal. 
In any event, the photos were not gruesome when 
compared to the relevant cases discussed above. In the present 
case, the photos generally depicted the relative positioning of 
the vehicles involved in the accident. (See| State's Exhibits 10, 
11, 12, 15 and 16.) Exhibits eleven and twelve depict accident 
debris including vehicle parts and a tennis shoe. Exhibits ten, 
fifteen, and sixteen depict the victim's truck. A clean white 
sheet is covering the victim's body lying in a horizontal 
position in the bed area of the truck. One clothed leg is 
exposed from about mid-calf to the bottom of the shoe worn by the 
victim. There is no blood on the sheet, on the visible clothing, 
or on the truck. In sum, there is no comparability with the 
bloody corpse photos found to be gruesome in Poe, Garcia, Cloud, 
and Lafferty. Accordingly, defendant's claim strains common 
sense and should be disregarded. 
Finally, defendant claims that the[photos were 
cumulative. It is well-settled that it is the trial court's 
responsibility to weigh the relevance of evidence against its 
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prejudice and the court's decision will not be overturned on 
appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown. State v. Garcia, 
663 P.2d 60, 64 (Utah 1983). 
In the instant case, the photographs were used to 
clarify and illustrate the testimony of a police officer who 
reconstructed the accident scene from evidence at the scene (R. 
178, pp. 86, 291-325). The photographs were probative and 
essential in determining from the accident scene evidence whether 
defendant was negligent, an essential fact in the case (R. 178, 
p. 86). The fact that the same evidence could have been provided 
by purely testimonial means does not in itself make a photograph 
inadmissible. State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 1983). Cf. State v. 
Cloud, 722 P.2d 750 (Utah 1986). 
In its ruling, the trial court stated: "I have 
reviewed those exhibits, and it is my judgment that they are not 
unnecessarily cumulative to the point that they will rise to any 
level of prejudice on the part of defendant." (R. 178 p. 290.) 
In light of the trial court's ruling, defendant's argument is 
unpersuasive that one photograph is not objectionable but one or 
two more photographs are reversibly prejudicial. 
Even if the trial court erred in admitting the alleged 
cumulative photos, this Court should not reverse the conviction 
unless the error "'is something substantial and prejudicial in 
the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its 
absence there would have been a different result.'" State v. 
Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985) quoting State v. Urias, 609 
P.2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1980). In light of the strong evidence of 
guilt, this Court should find that the trial court did not commit 
prejudicial error in admitting the challenged photographs. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent! respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm defendant's copviction. 
DATED this fc>&L day of February, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN pAM 
Attorney Genferal 
DAN R. 
Assistant 
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Attorney General 
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